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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Statement of the Problem:  The Real World 
 Today, one need not conduct research or seek academic studies to witness a growing 
segment of our global population: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Simply by 
turning on the television, picking up the front page of a newspaper or magazine, or going onto 
Facebook, Twitter or some other website, the faces and stories of refugees are front and center.  
Media and the press tell the story of what’s happening “over there” through captured images and 
stories of strangers and culturally “different” people; they paint a picture of a group of persons in 
need of saving.  Frequently, this depiction is reminiscent of colonization.   
 For example, refugees could easily represent the subject of a discussion about the 
increasing resistance to colonial authority by the 19th century Chinese: “(t)hese were people who 
experienced constant denial and humiliation because of their colour or origins…” (Duara, 2004, 
4) (note: italics added for emphasis).  Colonizers believed they were on a “civilizing mission” 
and, like the Reverend Frederick Farrar, they believed that these people had “not added one iota 
to the knowledge, the arts, the sciences, the manufactures, the morals of the world” (Duara, 80)1. 
When looking at today’s refugees, does the public really think any differently than the Reverend 
Farrar did back in 1867? Is it any different with foreign aid:  has foreign aid assumed the role of 
the colonizer, assisting refugees with the disbursement of food rations, water, shelter, and 
medical supplies, but rarely providing the refugee with an avenue to independence?  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#! Found in “Contested Hegemony” (Adas, M.), Ch. 8, footnote 1: ‘Aptitudes of the races’, Transactions of the 
Ethnological Society of London 5 (1867):120, in Decolonization: Perspectives From Now and Then (Duara, 2004). 
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 While there are many agencies focused on assisting refugees, many lack sufficient 
supplies and resources and therefore, are limited in their reach and impact. The agency 
RefugePoint carries a tagline, “A Lifeline for Forgotten Refugees”2 which not only suggests 
these limitations but underscores what seems to be common knowledge:  not all refugees can be 
assisted with the existing infrastructure.  While organizations like UNHCR claim to assist 
refugees with a variety of items, ranging from shelter to food and water to refugee registration, 
organizations seem lacking in the area of assisting refugees with becoming productive and 
contributing members of their local economies. When asked about this topic, a consistent 
response from NGOs was that they offered training to aid the refugee in their re-entry of the 
workforce and that they also held skills sessions to assist the refugee in broadening the types of 
jobs for which they would be qualified. But what benefits are there from trainings and workshops 
if the person is not considered suitable for employment by a society? 
 When examining this theme further, I found that some NGOs, like UNHCR, had 
experimented with the use of microfinance for refugees, as had commercial banks in poorer 
countries such as Ecuador. Unfortunately none boasted success.  Microfinance, or the lending of 
small loans to poor people who lack access to formal banking services, has been viewed as a 
transformative tool for the fact that it provides the “unbanked” poor, the same people who are 
commonly a part of an informal society, like refugees, with access to formal banking. 
Microfinance loans are typically purposed for business-related expenses tied to the upstart of a 
business or the purchase of supplies for a business, though some loans are used for consumption 
or household expenses. Microfinance serves as a bridge for the poor to gain access to the formal 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$!%&'()&*+",-.!!/--0.1122234&'()&0+",-3+4)1!!!
!
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society, through the formal financial services industry (Zeller & Meyer 2002). Therefore, if poor 
people who live in an informal society can gain access to formal financial services, and as a 
result, become part of the overall, formal society, why can’t refugees?  Why couldn’t 
microfinance be successfully extended to them? 
 In researching this question, I found that the most frequent reason for refugees not being 
included in microfinance programs traced back to social capital. Most organizations tended to 
look at social capital in the traditional definition, which is the definition commonly used by the 
World Bank:  
Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion 
is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. 
Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the 
glue that holds them together. (from: World Bank, Social Development, Social Capital 
Library, 2011)3 
 
The World Bank, and each organization that has adopted this definition, considers social capital 
to be the “glue”, a component that is critical to economic prosperity and development and 
essentially, the element that holds society, and its various institutions, together.  When 
considering microfinance, many microfinance organizations will not work with refugees because 
they believe the refugee lacks a connection to the society in which they are now living, as well as 
they lack a sense of responsibility to contribute to the development of that society- in other 
words, they lack social capital. These microfinance organizations also typically focus on the 
probability that the refugee represents a high flight risk: that the refugee will suddenly move 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5!Definition from World Bank website, Social Capital tab;  also cited in Poverty Capital, Roy, 2010 (66). 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTTSOCIALCAPITA
L/0,,contentMDK:20185164~menuPK:418217~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:401015,00.html   
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away and fail to repay their loan (Bartsch 2002; Jacobsen 2004), which again, points back to the 
refugee’s lack of social capital. Such shortcomings, as well as failed microfinance pilots which 
targeted refugees (Jacobsen 2004), make it difficult to argue that refugees actually do represent 
potential microfinance borrowers. 
 However, through the work of Ananya Roy (2010), I found an opening to look beyond 
traditional definitions and past failures. Roy states that “(g)roup-based, women-focused 
microfinance is seen to activate and mobilize “good” social capital.” (2010, 67). If social capital 
can develop through group-based microfinance, might there be a way to provide microfinance to 
refugees and not only assist them in business but provide a platform from which they might build 
social capital? 
 In order to examine these questions, I created a case study that would examine group-
based, microfinance programs in Tulcán, Ecuador, an area close to the Colombian border and 
home to both transient and settled Colombian refugees. Additionally Tulcán serves as home to 
one of UNHCR/ACNUR’s offices in the border region and also attracts other NGOs providing 
assistance to the refugees.  During my research, I found that all groups and individuals were 
willing to openly discuss their efforts and freely provided feedback on my findings and ideas. 
Above all, I found a genuine concern for the refugees and a dedication by all to create a more 
effective path that would enable the refugees in becoming more independent and self-
sustainable.   
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Research Methodology 
My thesis examines the extension of microfinance to a refugee population in order to 
assist them with an economic livelihood and a bridge to addressing their stated needs. I assert 
that refugees represent a growing socio-economic force within the global community yet one that 
cannot be assisted long-term by the majority of dedicated organizations that focus on refugee 
assistance. 
The methodology employed in my research was Informal Interviews and Participant 
Observation. I conducted informal interviews with professionals from microfinance 
organizations, banks, NGOs, Poverty Centers, UNHCR/ACNUR, and local citizens/residents 
situated in Ecuador and Colombia. I also employed a Direct Observation methodology for 
microfinance borrower meetings, which were divided between village-banking group meetings 
and individual loan meetings. 
My case study was built on the research that I collected over a 4-5 month period. 
Embarking upon this project, I designed three categories from which I would gain information 
and data: 
1. Informal interviews with professionals and academics who have focused their 
research and/or work on the topic(s) of refugees, IDPs, microfinance, the reduction of 
poverty, and/or development issues which tie into one (or more) of the previously 
mentioned topics. 
2. Research conducted during my internship in Ecuador in July 2011 working with the 
microfinance institution, Banco FINCA, and meeting with other NGO’s, MFIs, and 
other groups relevant to my analysis and this population. This research had the 
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objective of: a) understanding the existing situation, b) building knowledge about the 
organizations and services that are in place to assist the refugees and why they are 
doing the work they do (or cannot do), and c) understanding the needs and 
experiences of microfinance borrowers who live in the same region from the 
perspective of those borrowers.  
3. The design and administration of a survey targeting microfinance institutions in, or 
near, areas with refugee communities. Through this survey, my objective was to 
identify MFIs who were located within the same region as refugees and post-conflict 
area and to apply best practices learned through the survey to my case study region. 
Specifically my survey sought information surrounding two questions: 
a) Does the microfinance institution currently loan to persons defined as refugees  
and/or internally displaced persons?  
 
b) If not, under what circumstances might the microfinance institution be willing  
to provide refugees with financial products such as microcredit?  
 
The rationale for this analysis stemmed from the existing landscape of microfinance 
institutions lending to borrowers who appear more stable than refugees (who have inherent flight 
risk, especially in the eyes of a financial organization). Since these organizations range from 
conservative to progressive in terms of their business models and approaches, I thought that it 
would be reasonable to assume that a survey might result in a collection of unique practices, best 
business practices, and past-mistakes which others might learn from. Unfortunately, as I outline 
in the next section, I was unable to administer this survey; I did, however, successfully 
incorporate the questions I had originally designed for that survey in my Informal Interviews. 
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Limitations of Case Study 
While critical to a refugee’s integration in their new location, the first limitation of my 
case study is that it does not explore all of the critical issues that surround refugees, such as the 
legislation required to protect refugees in their new countries, the documentation process, formal 
versus informal housing, labor markets, and the discrimination, exploitation and abuse of 
refugees. I leave these questions to other researchers and agencies which are located around the 
world and especially in Colombia and Ecuador.  For the purpose of my case study, I narrowed 
the scope of my topic to examine if microfinance could serve as an effective tool which would 
help the refugee address their most important needs.  My focus does not suggest that these other 
issues are less important – they are equally, if not more, important. In fact, I would underscore 
the need for additional agencies, personnel, resources, and legislation to serve and protect these 
people who have risked their lives to migrate to Ecuador; these are people who have left most, if 
not all, of their possessions at home in Colombia and are determined to do any type of work in 
order to support their families in a new location. They are people from modest means and 
generally very poor, rural towns, but they, like anyone, have the right to basic services such as 
food, shelter, security, documentation for residency and medical aid. I leave the debates and 
revisions of legislation and processes to others; my research focuses on whether or not 
microfinance might be extended to refugees in Ecuador and if so, whether it could assist the 
refugee in addressing their unmet needs.    
A second limitation of my work is that my results are constrained by the length of time 
which I had to conduct my observations. While my research spanned five months, from late May 
through October 2011, most meetings were conducted once, on average, with unique 
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participants. As such, my research lacks the benefit of a longer timeframe over which I might 
have been better able to assess my findings or compare the research compiled from initial 
meetings; a longer timeframe may also permitted for measures of impact to be introduced to the 
study to analyze how microfinance affects (or does not affect) the borrower and his/her family. 
Additionally, because I had a limited timeframe, I did not have the opportunity for follow-up 
meetings with the same interviewees and borrowers. Such meetings may have provided insight 
as to whether participants were responding honestly or simply offering responses which they felt 
were appropriate for the discussion (or what they thought they should say). Without the 
opportunity to meet for a second (or even third) time, which would have introduced a 
comparative discussion in my findings, I can only trust (and hope) that people responded 
honestly and felt open enough to share their truth. 
Finally, while I initially thought a survey would be a contribution to the existing literature 
on microfinance and conflict-zones, feedback amongst practitioners was consistently not in favor 
of this method because there was a strong opinion that MFIs already receive too many surveys 
and questionnaires and that they are understaffed. Additionally there was a strong opinion that 
the MFIs which did have time to respond would have a volunteer (who generally would not be in 
a position to offer meaningful information) offer the response. There was also an overwhelming 
amount of feedback that the timing of my survey intersected with the writing of several very 
large grant-proposals. This, again, underscored the time-constraints that the MFIs face, 
especially at the time which I had targeted for my survey. Thus, in lieu of a survey, I embarked 
upon informal discussions with several MFIs, outside of the region of my case study, to better 
understand their points of view on refugees. While these discussions provided useful insight to 
the mindset of the MFIs, as well as the structure of, and influences on, the organizations, they did 
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not offer me the broad understanding of MFIs across multiple conflict and post-conflict zones, 
working with or around refugees, which I had originally thought helpful to my analysis. While 
there is much literature that has examined these topics, I was unable to contribute to that 
discussion. Therefore, on this topic, I rely on the existing research, such as that of Wilson, El-
Zoghbi, Bantug-Herrera, and Jacobsen, as well as others found in my literature review and 
referenced in my Bibliography. 
Timeline for Research 
 There were five stages associated with my research, starting with Stage One and 
following through to the completion of Stage Five. The timeline for the entire project spanned 
six months, June – early December 2011, and is outlined below. While I served as the sole 
researcher on this project, I did receive assistance from multiple employees of Banco FINCA, the 
microfinance organization where I interned, especially as they coordinated many of our meetings 
with borrowers and partner organizations; I also leaned on my Banco FINCA associates for 
periodic translations of more colloquial Spanish and challenging accents. 
     TASK      TIMEFRAME 
Stage One 
Identification of Sources for Informal Interviews   May - June 2011 
Informal Interviews       June 2011  
Design of Database (to store collected data)    June 2011 
Stage Two 
Participant Observation in Ecuador     July 2011 
Informal Interviews in Ecuador     July 2011 
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Stage Three 
Data Aggregation & Input of Observations     August 2011 
Continuation of Informal Interviews    August 2011 
Follow-up from Interviews     August 2011 
Stage Four 
Initial Assessment of Data      September 2011 
Supplemental Research      September 2011 
Final Data Assessment      October 2011 
Stage Five 
Organization of Project Results     November 2011 
Distribution of Project Results     December 2011 
 
Value Proposition of Research 
There are four main benefits that potentially will stem from my research. Ideally, my 
research will be shared across industry practitioners in the microfinance industry, with 
NGO/development groups who are focused on providing assistance to refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and with governments seeking to assist their country, or others, during and 
after times of conflict.  These four benefits are:  
1. Contribution to the literature about Colombian refugees; in particular, my research focuses 
on an approach through partnerships could enable the refugee to address their own needs. 
2. Information about the subset of refugees who migrate from Colombia (due to the conflict in 
their home country): while Colombian refugees and the domestic IDP group represent one of 
the largest refugee and IDP populations in the world, they rarely have a voice given they 
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migrate in small groups and are a byproduct of a multi-decade conflict4. I believe my 
research can provide useful data about this population, provide a human side to their 
situation, and continue to ask the question: what are the most important needs to a refugee, 
through their eyes and voices? 
3. The use of an existing financial tool (microfinance) with a new borrower profile. This 
application, i.e., the use of microfinance, will provide assistance to a refugee population and 
in turn, allow them to better function and contribute to the economy in those locations where 
they settle; 
4. My research will be beneficial to discussions surrounding the installation of microfinance in 
new markets, such as with refugees or IDPs and other prospective borrowers who may not fit 
the traditional profile with established social capital.  I hope that it will expand the mindset of 
those people working in microfinance, commercial banks, NGOs, and other entities that 
might, one day, be in a position to form, or join, a partnership which seeks to assist refugees 
and IDPs. 
 
Looking forward to the next section, Chapter 2, we turn to those themes that intersect the subject 
of my thesis: foreign aid, poverty, microfinance and refugees, and a review of the corresponding 
literature. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Colombian refugees generally migrate in small groups during the night, so as to avoid being seen by guerrilla 
groups, paramilitaries, police, or neighbors. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Introduction:  Once Upon a Time 
 The World Bank began as an idea to provide economic stabilization and reconstruction 
following World War II. Founded at the Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire in 1944 
and called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the IBRD began 
its business of lending in 1946. In this first year, the IBRD had a membership of 38 countries 
(Phillips, 2009). Through the 1950s and 1960s, the IBRD membership grew and by the 
beginning of 1970, IBRD had 109 members; twenty years later, at the end of 1990, there were 
158 members. Today in 2011, IBRD continues to serve as the main lender within the World 
Bank Group, it focuses on world development and poverty alleviation, and has a membership of 
187 countries (worldbank.org).   
 While its initial mandate was focused on the financing of capital-constrained countries 
after the devastation of WWII, the World Bank expanded its role in the 1950s to include 
assistance to developing countries. It was during this time that they moved beyond their 
traditional financing role to include other issues related to economic growth such as 
infrastructure projects. In 1956, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established 
under the World Bank Group as a lender to the private sector, and in 1960, the International 
Development Association (IDA) was created in response to the Bank’s expansion in order to 
provide soft loans and grants to the most-poor countries (Phillips, 2009).  Today, the World Bank 
Group is comprised of five divisions: the IBRD; the IDA; the IFC; the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) established in 1966; and the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), established in 1988 (worldbank.org). Over its sixty-five years of 
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history, the World Bank leadership has been varied; currently the Bank is directed by its 11th 
president, Robert Zoellick.   
World Bank: 1968 - 1991 
 In the late 1960s, the bank embarked upon a path to broaden the scope of their work, 
which included a greater orientation towards poverty alleviation and infrastructure projects; this 
shift was created and driven by Robert McNamara when he became Bank President. McNamara 
believed that investments and loans could not effectively combat poverty and its related 
problems. As Phillips research shows, McNamara felt that “direct, redistributional assistance to 
the rural and urban poor was needed, in terms of both finance and know-how” (2009, 8).  As 
McNamara embarked upon his mission to reform the World Bank, he seemed to identify every 
area of the Bank as an area in need of revitalization. Structurally, he implemented a President’s 
Council of Vice Presidents, who would serve as his advisors, as well as a body to whom he 
would be accountable. Over time, he changed the structure to an Executive Committee, which he 
believed would be more responsive to his ideas. In 1971, he implemented his fight against 
poverty through “poverty projects” (Phillips, 2009, 137) and served as the main sponsor of 
CGAR, the Consultative Group on Agricultural Research. Examining Bank efforts that focused 
on poverty-lending projects during the two years, 1968-1970, revealed roughly 5% of the Bank 
lending was dedicated to poverty issues; later, in 1979-1980, poverty-oriented lending jumped to 
30% of all Bank lending (Phillips, 2009). 
 Robert Ayres (1983) takes a closer look at the World Bank during the pivotal 
McNamara years where it sought to become a poverty alleviator to developing markets. Ayres 
work, specifically Banking on the Poor: The World Bank and World Poverty, sheds light on the 
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defining role that McNamara assumed as President of the World Bank, pointing out that before 
McNamara’s tenure, the World Bank avoided any role as a development agency, and attempted 
to behave more like a banking institution. Under McNamara, poverty projects grew in 
importance and focus for the World Bank.  Ayres offers his arguments based on research and 
interviews from former World Bank employees; he also asserts that McNamara attempted to 
redefine the purpose of development, aid and the role of the World Bank itself, recognizing that 
all were not functioning as they had been intended or designed.  This argument is notable in that 
it represents the first time a World Bank employee (President!) admitted that things were not 
working as they should be. Mild understatement as that might be, what stands out is the 
President’s admission that things were not working. 
 Years later, William Easterly, a former World Bank economist, picks up this argument 
and expands upon it. Easterly (2006) not only says, as McNamara recognized, that the 
development and aid industry, including the role of many agencies like the World Bank, has not 
succeeded, but he likens it to the period of colonization where the colonizer controlled all 
decisions and sought to ‘improve’ the lives of the colonists, which did nothing other than further 
the interests of the colonizer.  In his book, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to 
Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good (2006), Easterly argues that the West 
mistakenly thinks for the Rest (ie, developing countries) and that it fails to get the perspective of 
the people it seeks to assist. Easterly points out failed projects and the difference between 
“searchers” (people who seek answers based on a discovery-process including market feedback, 
competition, and the on-the-ground experience) and “planners” (people who think they have the 
answer in advance and implement a course based on that assumed knowledge). He also 
underscores a central theme of his research and opinions: the lack of understanding and lack of 
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accountability by the West and most aid agencies. In his book Reinventing Foreign Aid (2008), 
Easterly presents research and arguments to highlight economic development and 
microenterprise as areas that can assist the Rest; he advocates the need to teach relevant skills to 
the Rest which can be applied in an economic livelihood and therefore, provide them with a 
source of income. In considering Easterly’s argument and research, I question why more NGOs 
wouldn’t take the approach of pursing strategies that encourage targeted populations to become 
self-sustainable and increasingly less dependent on provisions and handouts?  Isn’t that the 
objective that, ultimately, every NGO says they are working towards? 
Development, Aid, and New Approaches 
 In the literature about development and aid, there is an abundant amount of work 
written on, or about, the “dialogue” between Easterly and the economist Jeffrey Sachs, not to 
mention the commentaries offered by Easterly or Sachs themselves in response to one another’s 
opinions and research.  While there are strong distinctions between these two economists, both 
share a common concern about world poverty. Easterly (2006) advocates the free market 
approach for solving complex problems, and openly criticizes the “throw money at it” approach 
which he argues is the pathway taken by most aid agencies. Sachs (2002), on the other hand, 
believes that an increase in funding can make a difference and can effectively lift countries out of 
poverty and out of the “poverty trap” that so often they fall into. Both Easterly and Sachs, while 
perhaps not willingly or openly, find common ground with economic programs such as 
microcredit, which both indicate, under the right circumstances, can prove beneficial to a local 
community through the creation of economic livelihoods. Such ingredients bode well for a more 
defined course towards independence and security. 
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 Another area in which Easterly and Sachs differ is the celebrity “cause-advocate”.  
Whereas Easterly openly criticizes those celebrities who adopt causes such as AIDS, claiming 
their work results in little, if any, progress for the cause, Sachs aligns himself with celebrities 
who campaign for issues that overlap with his own work, such as malaria and poverty 
eradication. From a broader perspective, the topic of “celebrity-philanthropist” has received 
much attention in recent years, going well-beyond the Easterly-Sachs debate; it has even led to 
the manufacturing of new words which classify this special breed and the industry: celanthropist, 
celanthropy, philanthrocapitalism, to name a few. With more and more people entering the field 
of development, like these celebrities, it is questionable whether more people rallying for a cause 
translates to more aid for a charity or “cause”. If more aid is not created or distributed, what 
purpose do these celebrity advocates really have?  
 In the book Philanthrocapitalism: How Giving Can Save the World (2009), Matthew 
Bishop and Michael Green examine how a slightly different group of people are also 
increasingly getting involved: very wealthy, high-profile people are combining their business 
acumen and skills with their significant financial fortunes and they are attempting to combat 
social issues and global problems. Bishop and Green provide numerous examples of active, 
hands-on, charitable-giving efforts by individuals who are billionaires (Gates, Buffett) and 
celebrities (Bono, Oprah). While it is too early in the process to measure the impact of these 
actions, philanthrocapitalism represents significant pools of money which are being purposed 
towards social issues. In earlier work, Matthew Bishop (2008) also argues that the new breed of 
philanthropist is getting into “the trenches”, approaching the “fronts” of social causes by getting 
out to where the issues are and attempting to raise awareness of what is transpiring. Stepping 
back to analyze their efforts, it appears that they are successful in raising the public’s awareness 
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(often with the help of their own public relations team) yet the effectiveness of their efforts, as 
with celebrities, appears limited, too early to diagnose, or unknown. What is known is that there 
are more people involved though this increase has not necessarily translated to more aid for the 
people who need assistance. 
 Ashok Khosla (2008) emphasizes the need to leverage knowledge when approaching 
social issues, such as poverty, and the need to scale operations in order to create income and 
profit. Khosla’s research asks the question: what economic tool will have the most impact in the 
effort to end poverty? The answer which emerges from his work stems from the community that 
is being targeted which leads Khosla to become an advocate for community ventures, social 
enterprise businesses, and “network enablers”, which provide assistance to a community’s efforts 
where/when that assistance is needed. As Khosla argues, similar to Easterly, no one knows what 
the community needs more than the community itself. Khosla, being a subscriber to the 
principles of the free-market and a venture capital practitioner, calls for the scaling of these 
community efforts, into the small and medium enterprise (SME) space.5 Khosla suggests that the 
creation of social enterprise businesses within a community could be a possible alternative to 
traditional development efforts, such as outright aid/grants. 
More on the Topic of Aid 
 Like Easterly and Sachs, Paul Collier’s work demonstrates grounding in historical data, 
statistical trends and economic research. In his book, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6!The SME area is a more expansive effort than microfinance and can potentially have more impact in a community:  
the focus is on a large business, such as a factory or food cooperative (i.e., a business with many employees 
responsible for a certain level of production, and the business has potential for a minimum threshold profit) – this 
differs from smaller, more individualized, businesses associated with microfinance. 
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Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (2007), Collier asks the question central 
to the Easterly and Sachs debate: “Is Aid Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?” (123). 
Collier’s findings suggest that aid “improves the opportunities for private investment” (123) but 
that it has been overemphasized as a panacea, or cure-all. Collier affirms that aid alone has 
limitations, inherent problems and “…will not be sufficient to turn the societies of the bottom 
billion around” but that it does offer some value and thus, “is part of the solution rather than part 
of the problem.” (123). Collier states that aid is a part of the broad array of instruments and 
policies which need to be developed, and from which, solutions may be designed and 
implemented by groups such as the G8.  
 Another point of view about the aid industry is represented by Graham Hancock in, 
Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the International Aid Business (1989). 
While written nearly two decades before Easterly, Sachs and Collier, Hancock argues that the aid 
industry (mainly official aid agencies and some NGOs) is shameless, corrupt and broken and that 
it is filled with puffed-up “humanitarians” who face no accountability for their work and 
spending decisions. Hancock offers numerous examples to support his allegations and renames 
the aid industry, “Development Incorporated” (42).  Hancock presents evidence of the spider-
web that aid agencies have created and have become entangled in, which includes projects 
ranging from “sanitation, water and sewerage works, ports and airports, trains and boats and 
planes, crop spraying,… (to) construction of hotels, mining,… family planning programmes,… 
debt relief, balance-of-payments support,... building bridges,… (and) teaching foreign 
languages” (42). He argues that the majority of work by aid and development agencies lacks 
input from the targeted group which these agencies attempt to assist, and frequently, the efforts 
do not result in any known benefit. As Hancock states, more often than not, development 
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projects “wreck the lives of the poor” (113) and “… in many countries the poor now see 
development ‘as an alien process, something done to them and a waste of effort’” (128).   
 Dambisa Moyo would have to agree with Hancock. In her book, Dead Aid: Why Aid is 
Not Working and How There is a Better Way for Africa (2009), Moyo argues that the pathway to 
assist Africa is not through aid but rather through a new approach, based on financing and 
economic growth opportunities. She suggests use of market-based solutions such as the bond 
market, an expansion of microfinance efforts, wide-scale investment in large infrastructure 
projects, and new property laws.  She calls for a decrease in aid which would result in a full 
stoppage within a decade. Clearly, despite both working for the same employer earlier in their 
respective careers (The World Bank), Moyo clearly takes an opposite opinion from Jeffrey Sachs 
on the need for more aid in Africa and would like to see an “end date” on the horizon for all aid. 
And You Thought Poverty Was Just a Lack of Money? 
 There is a plethora of information about poverty nowadays, ranging from statistical 
work that defines, measures and dissects poverty, to the extensive research, case studies, and 
theories that examine root causes, justify the existence (of poverty), and demonstrate the 
pathway which will finally reduce or even eradicate poverty all together.  The number and 
variety of actors in the poverty industry are many, and at times, confusing: NGOs, nonprofits, 
for-profits-with-a-social-mission, research centers (frequently associated with colleges and 
universities), divisions of corporations dedicated to social causes (many stemming from their 
Corporate Social Responsibility focus), family foundations, community foundations, impact 
investors, high net worth individuals, celebrities, and the catch-all category, consultants. And 
above all, there are the poor themselves, who serve as the central characters of much research 
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yet, often, are without a voice or avenue that would include their own participation in efforts that 
seek to assist (or examine) them, “the poor”. In recent years, the majority of literature on poverty 
has gravitated towards several debates which appear to direct much of the dialogue and studies.  
 The first debate that appears again and again is the categorization of poverty. How is 
poverty defined and categorized? Are these definitions consistent amongst NGOs, researchers, 
donors, and other industry participants? Are such categories consistent across regions and 
cultures? Can categories truly be adapted based on prices for food across countries; do those 
choices have the same meaning for each country and is it really possible to compare regions 
using standardized categories? Lanjouw examines these questions in her research, focusing on 
the construction of poverty lines that can be used to measure effects of public policy and social 
welfare (2001).  In his book, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (2005), 
Jeffrey Sachs distinguishes between three levels of poverty: “extreme (or absolute) poverty, 
moderate poverty, and relative poverty.” (20)  As Sachs indicates, the World Bank focuses on 
daily income (adapted across regions for purchasing power parity), where people living in 
extreme poverty earn $1 day, those who earn $1 - $2 live in moderate poverty. It is assumed that 
those who make $2 or (slightly more) a day, live in what he calls relative poverty. Much of 
Sachs’ research focuses on the reduction, and elimination, of extreme poverty, which Sachs 
believes to be feasible over a defined period of time.  
 Muhammad Yunus also devises categories in order to dissect poverty on three levels. 
As stated in Banker to the Poor (1999), when analyzing a population, he uses the following 
categories: P1 as representation of the bottom 20% (“hard-core poor”/absolute poor), P2 as the 
bottom 35%, and P3 as the bottom 50% of the population (41).  However, unlike Sachs and (to 
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some extent) Yunus, Easterly (2006) mocks the use of such metrics, including another widely-
used World Bank statistic: the international poverty line, which is measured at $1.25 a day based 
on purchasing power parity in 2005. Overall, Easterly is not shy about criticizing much of the aid 
industry’s efforts to “fight” poverty, calling it unproductive and wasteful and frequently citing 
examples to underscore his points. Thus, his criticism of specific measures seems in character, 
and at times, actually demonstrates the importance of having some type of categories as an 
agreed-upon language for the industry. I question whether such debates about semantics are 
worthwhile or if they simply redirect resources away from addressing the actual problem. Given 
the volumes of literature on categories of poverty and the calculation of such categories, it 
appears that the industry is somewhat caught up in its own debates, forgetting the people who 
they are, in theory, attempting to assist.  
 A second debate in the literature focuses on whether aid and development programs 
have helped – or hurt- the poor. Easterly (2006) asserts that aid has not helped the poor but has, 
in fact, contributed to the worsening of their situation. On the other side of the discussion, Sachs 
(2005) states that development aid can be effective when that aid is not only large enough, but 
provided for a long enough period of time during which poor households can rise above a basic 
sustenance level. Easterly and Sachs frequently espouse their respective theories, and generally 
disagree with one another on the topic of aid and the need for development programs; research 
by others tend to dissect one or both of their arguments, offering more clarity on the work and 
writings of either Easterly or Sachs (or both).  What stands out when assessing these arguments 
is the amount of resources that support each side of the argument while little, in comparison, is 
directly allocated to the people who are intertwined in this discussion: the poor. 
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 In the middle, more or less, of the aid debate, stands Ananya Roy. In her book, Poverty 
Capital: Microfinance and the Making of Development (2010), Roy encapsulates what she views 
as the motivation fueling the extensive attention in recent years (and currently) on poverty, its 
statistics, and the vast number of organizations formed to “do something” about poverty. Roy 
states: 
…there is nothing new about poverty. The issue is how and why at particular historical 
moments, poverty becomes sharply visible and serves as a lightning rod for social action 
and change. …What is unusual about the present historical moment is that poverty has 
become visible as a global issue. The focus has shifted from the modernization of 
national economies to the alleviation of the poverty of the “bottom billion,” the 1.4 
billion people…living under the threshold of the international poverty line. (6-7) 
In other words, Roy asks the question: why has poverty become so “popular”?  Unlike Easterly 
or Sachs who take a firm stand on the role of aid, Roy takes an approach that leans toward the 
acknowledgement of all issues which surround poverty. Roy does not question the impact of aid 
or the existence of aid’s destructive wake; instead, she examines the themes surrounding the 
participants (such as NGOs, governments, and the poor). Effectively, Roy’s research steps inside 
the development world in order to better understand what type of work is conducted (or being 
discussed) to improve the lives of the poor and what impact (positive or negative) that work has 
or is projected to have. In other words, Roy doesn’t take a side of the debate, but rather, she 
attempts to understand the impact that aid has had, for better or worse; her net assessment leans 
towards the effectiveness of market-driven solutions for the poor.  
 In looking at market-driven solutions, microfinance emerges. Microfinance has also 
generated much discussion over the last decade and serves as the theme for a third debate in 
poverty research. Over the last decade, Muhummad Yunus has been instrumental at increasing 
awareness about microfinance and its impact on the poor; his writings, his efforts with his 
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microfinance institution, Grameen Bank, in Bangladesh, his many speeches, and his selection (on 
behalf of Grameen Bank) for the 2006 Nobel Prize for Peace, introduced and spread the notion 
that the poor were not only hard working people but they didn’t want direct handouts. Through 
his research, Yunus demonstrated that poor people borrow from family, friends, and 
moneylenders for expenses including business-related costs, medication, food, emergency-
related expenses, and wedding dowries. He demonstrated that the high interest rates charged by 
moneylenders commonly led borrowers to take out another loan from another creditor, in order 
to pay off the more costly loan, and that this often was a continuous cycle that transferred from 
generation to generation of the poor. Through the introduction of very small loans with a fixed 
interest rate cap (ceiling), Yunus began a microcredit program that involved into Grameen Bank. 
Over time, high loan repayments and decreased reliance on moneylenders, coupled with 
improvements to borrowers’ diets and increased education of school aged children, served as 
indicators that microcredit (through Grameen Bank) was having a positive impact on the lives of 
the poor. (1999, 2007).   
 Research conducted by Martin Greeley (2005) takes the idea of positive impact 
stemming from microfinance and analyzes it further: Greeley closely examines eight 
microfinance institutions in varying regions (his analysis does not include Grameen Bank). His 
research provides evidence that borrowers’ households improve due to the combined approach 
that is taken by many MFIs in which they offer loans but also teach the borrower about savings 
(the savings program assists the client in both repaying their loan and starting a modest savings 
account). Greeley demonstrated that this combination provided the upfront money to improve the 
borrower’s household (repairs to the shelter, purchase of material assets in the home) yet also 
forced the borrower to save and thereby repay the loan through a disciplined and timely 
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approach. However, Greeley’s work also stated that the affect on the poor – the actual impact or 
movement away from poverty- was inconclusive; while he noted that all MFIs were willing to 
work with him to measure the effectiveness of their work, the MFIs did not have adequate 
records that tracked their borrowers over long periods of time. The lack of such records suggests 
that there is insufficient data about the progress of the borrowers and therefore one cannot 
assume that they have made progress out of poverty (2005). Thus, one might conclude that 
microfinance can be beneficial for improving the quality of the borrower’s life though additional 
research is required to determine if it carries the impact that Yunus’ work suggests. 
 Continuing a deeper analysis, Roy, who, as mentioned above, approaches microfinance 
from a slightly different vantage point, differentiating between microfinance programs which are 
“self-regulating, market-based” and can serve to spur economic growth and independence from 
those that are “donor-subsidized” and generally “unsustainable and neocolonial” (2010, 215). 
This distinction is important as much research uses the term, microfinance, to denote the full 
spectrum of microfinance programs without concern for a critical variable such as the program’s 
funding structure; in other words, not all microfinance programs are the same nor do all represent 
equal opportunities to reach the poor, thus, they cannot be lumped together under the same 
umbrella-term, microfinance. In reality, the funding structure of an MFI is critical in 
understanding the MFI:  
- donor-subsidized microfinance programs are driven by money from donors and the 
strategies that are designed by the donor; this structure can lead to inefficiency or 
shortcomings since the MFI must adhere to that strategy to maintain the funding.  
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- self-regulating or market-based MFIs are driven by the need to become profitable and 
self-sustainable; this structure focuses on loan volume and savings; it is not reliant on 
donor-aid for survival. 
 Digging further into the literature about microfinance, there appears to be an increasing 
amount of work focusing on impact, especially in regard to the effectiveness of microfinance 
programs.  Studies on impact examine if the use of microfinance is, or has been, successful vis a 
vis indicators such as the food or housing of the borrower, assessing if there have been 
improvements to the borrower’s diet or shelter. However, the literature exposes a lack of 
consistency in impact measurement. Zeller and Meyer (2002) argue that the industry’s lack of 
agreement on the best methodology for measuring impact, let alone to assess results, leads to 
difficulties in making recommendations. Effectively, this shortcoming curtails the industry’s 
knowledge of its own impact: how do institutions really know what impact they are having if 
methodologies vary by organization? How can a large donor funding multiple microfinance 
institutions assess their collective impact if each one has its own form of impact measurement? 
While Zeller and Meyer do attempt to measure the reach of a microfinance institution (such as: 
reaching the rural poor versus urban poor, and the average poor versus the extreme poor), they 
struggle with linking the MFI’s work to impact. Reasons for this difficulty trace back to the 
complexity and high costs associated with data collection and methodology (2002). As I review 
the literature associated with these challenges I am reminded of the debate about the 
effectiveness of foreign aid, its complexity and the costs involved with its data collection and 
methodology; it is unclear why more resources are not allocated towards improving methodology 
and the processes of data collection versus the theoretical debates. Wouldn’t it make sense to 
have tangible evidence to support a debate?    
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 Indeed, varying forms of methodology exist, ranging from a simplistic verbal 
questioning approach to the very expensive and elaborate randomized control trials (RCT), with 
each attempting to quantify the impact of microfinance or a related component stemming from 
an input tied to microfinance. On the high-end of that spectrum (from a cost and resource 
perspective) is the research of Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel, who use randomized control trials 
to examine impact in a controlled environment. In More Than Good Intentions (2011), Karlan 
and Appel present their latest research, arguing that results can be read in a variety of ways. For 
example, they assert that if RCT results are not positive, meaning that if the trial is either 
inconclusive or concludes a lack of impact, it is still critical to study the impact of actions and 
the targeted attempts of assistance. They state that impact may or may not be measurable through 
RCT but that a lack of measurement does not necessarily imply a lack of impact; Karlan and 
Appel suggest that all actions have impact, but not everything can be measured.  As their book’s 
title suggests, the industry surrounding poverty, the development world, the poor, need more 
than just the good intentions of a bunch of actors in the space; each needs (and deserves)  results, 
whether measurable or not, that indicate a change for the better, especially as viewed by the 
person living in poverty. 
Knock, Knock (Who’s There?) 
 In examining the literature on poverty, it was apparent that there was a disproportionate 
amount of research on the topics detailed above, yet very little work that offered the voice of the 
poor.  However, several researchers stood apart from the majority. Graham Hancock argues that 
the poor are rarely, if ever, included, and offers detailed accounts of the disconnected work of 
development agencies “working” with the poor (1989). Deepa Narayan attempts to remedy this 
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void, gathering experiences from the poor and from populations across over 60 countries and 
regions over the 1990s (2000, 2002). Packed into a lengthy series entitled Voices of the Poor 
(2000, 2002), Narayan presents views that stem from conversations with 60,000 poor people 
living in 60 countries across the globe. Her research highlights the lack of impact often 
associated with NGOs work in a region, as well as their lack of accountability: “(p)oor people 
would like NGOs to be accountable to them” (Can Anyone Hear Us, 2000, ix).  Through her 
research, she also uncovers what poor people desire: “poor people do not want charity but 
opportunity” (Can Anyone Hear Us, 2000, 274) and she suggests a new strategy for change, one 
that is built on recognition of the realities of the poor and aimed at investing in “development 
entrepreneurs” (Can Anyone Hear Us, 2000, 281) who can facilitate positive change. Narayan 
also analyzes the “newly” poor: those individuals who are poor as a result of conflict and war, 
including internally displaced persons and refugees. In later research, Moving out of Poverty: 
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Mobility (2007), Narayan, along with Patti Petesch, offer 
research that focused on 500 communities in 17 countries to better understand reasons and 
conditions for either remaining impoverished or moving out of poverty.  They present evidence 
that uphold the belief that inequalities are “perpetuated by the dominant social structures and 
values and norms that determine the opportunity structure poor people face” (2) and they 
conclude that because of these obstacles in society, it is significantly challenging for poor people 
to move out of poverty. 
 In Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor live on $2 a Day, Daryl Collins, 
Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford and Orlanda Ruthven (2009) present their findings from a 
year’s amount of time working with over 250 poor people and closely analyzing their 
relationship with money.  This bottom-up research revealed that the poor actually plan for the 
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challenges that they face, such as irregular employment, income, and illness/disease, and that 
they allocate money to various accounts, including savings, in order to plan to the fullest extent 
possible. The significance of these findings is that the poor think no differently than people with 
money, which might sound simple, however, the significance of their work stems from the fact 
that this hypothesis had not previously been tested so thoroughly (2009).  Whereas Muhammad 
Yunus may have suggested similar patterns from his own research, his own approach had been 
less research-intensive and much more regionally concentrated (1999). Collins, Morduch, 
Rutherford and Ruthven demonstrate that the poor borrow and the poor save, with or without 
access to microcredit, and they manage their lives around the flow of money, just like everyone 
else, rich or poor.  
Microfinance: Basic Components  
 Looking at the debates around development and aid, it appears inconclusive whether aid 
can reduce poverty over time. While aid might offer a respite from the extreme cycles of poverty, 
it seems questionable that it can eliminate poverty all together. Studies on microfinance 
programs, especially those that are “self-regulated” and “market-based”, seem more hopeful as 
they appear to generate some economic independence while contributing to the growth of 
smaller economies (Roy, 2010).  Both of these factors, economic independence and economic 
growth, represent outputs that, when combined, might deliver more lasting progress than aid. 
And that progress, thus far, appears to be an improvement to the microfinance borrower’s quality 
of life, or a shift towards a less-poor lifestyle.  But does microfinance really work? Can it break 
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the cycle of poverty and “lift people out of poverty”? 6 While there is compelling evidence to 
indicate “yes”, there are also arguments to the contrary.  To better understand whether or not 
microfinance is effective, it is important to examine what microfinance is and what it is designed 
to offer. 
 As Joanna Ledgerwood states in the Microfinance Handbook (1999), a well-know 
reference book in the microfinance industry, microfinance “has evolved as an economic 
development approach to benefit low-income women and men” (1). Ledgerwood points out that 
microfinance generally refers to the provision of microcredit loans and microsavings programs 
though often insurance products, trainings (skills, financial literacy), and healthcare services are 
packaged into the loan or are distributed by the microfinance institution (MFI). In his research, 
Suresh Sundaresan (2008) assesses the models of microfinance that have developed since 1980. 
Sundaresan examines four models of microfinance organizations: the NGO, the non-bank 
financial institution (NBFI), the rural bank which is part of the nationalized bank, and the village 
bank.  These models set the stage for microfinance since microfinance institutions fall into one of 
these four categories; some MFIs progress from one model to the next, such as starting as an 
NGO, advancing (though legal filings) to an NBFI, and sometimes on to the status of a bank 
(either rural or village). Banco FINCA in Ecuador is an example of a microfinance institution 
that went through these stages in order to offer increased services to their clients7. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!Microfinance organizations and industry practitioners tend to use the phrase “lift people out of poverty” when 
describing the goal(s) of microfinance programs. An example of this common phrase can be found at: 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADN074.pdf  
8!During July 2011, I interned at Banco FINCA in Ecuador and learned about their history: they started as an NGO, 
evolved into a non-bank financial institution, and later, became a registered bank in Ecuador. 
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Social Capital 
 Social capital is a significant component in microfinance and its literature, not to 
mention a critical element of societies throughout the world. The concept of social capital is one 
that is critical to microfinance, as well as to the development and aid industry, and to societies 
across most, if not all, cultures.  It is a term that is generally associated with the bonds that serve 
to unite a community. According to the World Bank (2011): 
Social capital refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and 
quantity of a society's social interactions. Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion 
is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. 
Social capital is not just the sum of the institutions which underpin a society – it is the 
glue that holds them together (from: World Bank, Social Development, Social Capital 
Library, 2011) 
 
 While Stiglitz looks at social capital in conjunction with institutions and relationships, 
he examines its importance within markets, especially inside the failure of markets, or in what he 
calls an “information paradigm”. Social capital for Stiglitz invokes efficient information, 
knowledge, networks, and functional markets (2000).  Roy (2010) emphasizes that social capital 
can become economic capital and distinguishes between “good” and “bad” social capital. Roy 
also looks at the role of social capital in group-based microcredit programs and indigenous 
rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) to show how social capital can develop as 
one’s role in group-based programs evolves and interacts with other members.  
 In his essay Social Capital and Poverty, Paul Collier (1998) states, “social capital is 
called ‘social’ because it involves people being sociable” (2); for social capital to be capital, “its 
economic effects must have some persistence” (4).  Similarly, Deepa Narayan and Lant Pritchett 
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(2000) demonstrate that social capital is social in that it has influence from household to 
household and that it is capital in the sense that it increases incomes.  Social interaction and 
economic influence seem to be two key characteristics of social capital.  Microfinance 
institutions evaluate potential borrowers based on factors including social capital: the role that 
the borrower might have in society (or their ability to be successful in business) and their ability 
(or potential) to earn an income.  Are these the only factors that can measure a borrower’s 
likelihood for loan repayment? Are there other measures that might be considered? 
Microfinance in Conflict Zones and Refugees 
 There have been volumes written about microfinance over the last three decades, 
focusing on a variety of topics, sectors and regions. Generally speaking, when there has been 
conflict, such as with Kosovo, Angola, and Rwanda, microfinance has entered the region as one 
of the “tools” to assist in the economic rebuilding of the region, post-conflict (Wilson, 2002). 
One notable exception has been Colombia, where microfinance demonstrates approximately two 
decades of history during the country’s ongoing (nearly 50 year old) civil war. Colombia’s 
conflict has produced one of the largest groups of refugees in the world: Colombian refugees 
typically migrate within their country’s borders, from region to region, and are categorized as 
internally displaced persons (IDPs); a subset regularly flees the country into neighboring 
Ecuador (Korovkin, 2008). While these refugees have left their homes due to war-related 
violence, they find a different chaos in their new country, with very little assistance to guide 
them towards a new start.   
 A number of research reports focus on case studies, looking at the use of microfinance 
and related services in countries stricken by conflict, with many case studies leaning towards 
  
32 
!
post-conflict recovery (Wilson, 2002; El-Zoghbi, Bantug-Herrera, 2008; ESDWA, 2009).  
Additionally many reviews focus on the use of microfinance in the area of development and 
whether or not it has been an effective contributor in the redevelopment of the region (Wilson, 
2002). Still further, several countries with existing conflict served as the focus of case studies: 
Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. Through their research, the Economic and Social Commission for 
Western Asia (ESDWA) analyzed strategies in microfinance and development and looked at the 
impact on building peace (ESDWA, 2009); Azerbaijan’s service sector was also examined, in the 
context of workers who had fled their rural homes for less volatility in urban locations 
(Kvernröd, 2004).  
Overall, across all regions, studies focusing on locations with conflict seem to be less 
common, perhaps due to the risks involved, the costs to fund such projects, and the challenges 
related to working with a group of borrowers living in turbulence (Nagarajan and McNulty, 
2004).  Yet, where there have been studies, microfinance is shown to promote peace building, 
lessen dependency on relief, start the initial growth of war-torn economies, support relief and 
development programs, improve gender roles and increase self-worth (Wilson, 2002).  However, 
there is also recognition that multiple objectives for using microfinance has led to great 
confusion and that the decrease of providers due to opportunity costs and risks during periods of 
conflict negatively impacts the microfinance markets, given the expansion of the informal 
business sector during such fragile times. As a result, informal microfinance develops in high 
conflict zones, followed by semi-formal microfinance. Essential components for the 
implementation of informal microfinance were found to be trust, borrower information, and 
market knowledge, whereas in semi-formal microfinance, security was viewed as the most 
important condition for program implementation (Wilson, 2002). 
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  In other research, there was a theme which underscored the need for better guidance for 
microfinance groups in conflict zones.  It also appeared that additional research is needed to 
better determine if microfinance can be used in the mitigation and management of conflict 
(Nagarajan, 2004).  Related to this theme is the need for regulatory reviews which might 
improve local microfinance groups (ESCWA, 2009), perhaps due to the lack of laws (or law-
enforcement professionals) in conflict zones. 
 Other work analyzes the types of assistance that might most benefit the refugee or 
internally displaced person, and whether microfinance is a tool that can assist this population 
(Bartsch, 2004; Nagarajan, 2004). Research demonstrates that when delivered in combination 
with business training and a pro-business environment, microfinance can be a “viable avenue for 
self reliance”; however, microfinance is often utilized as a “quick fix to jumpstart refugee 
livelihoods” (Bartsch, 2004). In addition to business training, it was determined that vocational 
training and credit training would be beneficial to those workers who had migrated from rural to 
urban markets (Kvernröd, 2004).                                                                                                       
 There has also been review of the effectiveness that MFIs can provide to the conflict 
region, which also requires a supportive government to promote their efforts and uphold legal 
regulations (ESCWA, 2009).  Some view microfinance as a tool to create employment and to 
help ease suffering that stems from civil conflict.   It has also been shown to have positive impact 
on the restoration of social capital that typically erodes during periods of conflict. On the 
negative side, there is some indication that microfinance cannot be sustainable nor reach a large 
population of borrowers due to the volatile conditions of the region; thus microfinance in a 
conflict zone is limiting by nature of the environment (Nagarajan and McNulty, 2004).   
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 Finally, looking at the stated objective of microfinance, poverty alleviation, studies 
underscore the need for the MFI to stay focused on reaching those individuals living in poverty 
and blocked from income-generating labor as a result of the conflict (ESCWA, 2009).  Refugees 
demonstrate that they are resourceful and willing to work and to rebuild their lives, if given 
resources and opportunity; refugees state and demonstrate that they seek self-reliance (De 
Vriese, 2006; El-Zoghbi, Bantug-Herrera, 2008).  Such studies would suggest that many 
microfinance institutions neither reach the extreme poor nor work with persons who are 
classified as refugees, yet both groups contain characteristics associated with ideal borrowers 
under “normal circumstances”. 
Summary 
 This review of the literature began with the story of the World Bank, an organization 
that was initially created in order to stabilize and reconstruct a war-torn Europe, post World War 
II. Over the decades, the World Bank expanded its mandates to include poverty alleviation, a 
highly debated role both inside and outside of the Bank. Many academics and researchers have 
attempted to assess the impact of efforts by the World Bank and other NGOs, in order to 
determine if their aid actually helps the poor. Other researchers who also focus on poverty 
alleviation follow a more market-based solution approach, examining the effects of microfinance 
programs on the poor. Most of these researchers draw upon social capital as the binding material 
in a society that creates social norms and the quality of social interactions, and use social capital 
as one of the criterion in evaluating candidates for microfinance. 
 The literature on microfinance and refugees is extensive though produces mixed results 
given the transient nature of refugees. However there is evidence that suggests that informal 
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microfinance develops in high conflict regions, later to be followed by more formal programs 
once the conflict subsides. In post-conflict regions, studies document that citizens, generally 
extremely poor following conflict, seek training and employment; refugees and IDPs 
demonstrate a strong desire to work, with many migrating to urban locations where employment 
opportunities are much greater. 
 Yet, much of the research is inconclusive and raises the following questions: Is there 
sufficient aid to assist all poor people who are in need? Can microfinance be a tool to assist the 
poor? Are microfinance institutions willing to work with refugees who generally are lacking in 
social capital? Might microfinance be a pathway not to “lift the poor out of poverty” but to 
extend a loan to a hard-working person who seeks opportunity and independence? 
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Chapter 3:  Statement of Thesis 
 My thesis asks the question: can microfinance be provided to a refugee population and 
by doing so, would that assist the refugee in addressing their unmet needs?  Through a case-
study that examined Colombian refugees in Ecuador, I brought this question into the field to look 
at the realities associated with this refugee grouping, the microfinance institutions located in 
Ecuador, and the NGOs that service this community. 
Background  
 Microfinance is often introduced to a population that lives in a stable region afflicted by 
significant poverty. It also has been used as an economic tool within countries that are focused 
on post-conflict growth, during the country’s reconstruction phase (Nagarajan, McNulty, 2004). 
Microfinance in Latin America has a history of over 20 years, much of which has been tied to the 
work of more established microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as FINCA, ProMujer and 
Accion.  By virtue of their tenure in the region, but also from the relationships they have built 
over time with other MFIs, NGOs, state officials, donors, and others, many Latin American 
MFIs also have extensive networks across the region and world, bringing a range of best 
practices to their own operations. 
 The Colombian refugee population living in Ecuador is a subset of a group of persons 
who have fled conflict zones within Colombia. The roughly 50 year long civil conflict between 
guerrilla groups and the Colombian government and military has produced one of the world’s 
largest refugee situations, though the majority of these people are categorized as internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), since they remain within the borders of Colombia, typically migrating 
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from rural areas to urban locales in search of safety8. However, due to the mountainous 
geography of southwest Colombia and the security issues related to the conflict, the people of 
this region typically flee to Ecuador, crossing country borders without authorization. As a result, 
this group lives in an in-between condition, attempting to settle into their new country but 
unaware of logistics and the legalities to steer towards a safe reality. Generally, these people are 
very poor, from rural/agricultural communities, and lacking in resources to begin life in a new 
country.  Both countries, Ecuador and Colombia, have skeletal operations in place to assist this 
group; as such, because there is little assistance, refugees face lack of organization, few, if any, 
public services, and a continuation of a life filled with uncertainty. Whereas they fled their 
homes in Colombia due to fear and threats stemming from the conflict, they end up trading one 
set of issues for another, living their lives on the fringe of society, not fully integrated, not legally 
seen, and therefore, not granted access into the formal societies of their new locations. 
UNHCR/ACNUR estimates that there are approximately 130,000 refugees living in Ecuador, 
despite only 25-30% being registered as refugees. Unlike many other countries with refugees, 
these people do not sleep in tents or donor-funded housing complexes where they might be more 
easily counted and registered; because of the nature of their migration, these refugees generally 
live in very informal housing, are not always informed about the registration processes, and are 
not easily found in the rural topography where roughly half the population is said to live. 
 Beyond these refugees of Ecuador and the IDPs in Colombia, there stands a larger 
group of combined refugees and IDPs. According to the 2010 year-end statistics from UNHCR, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9!United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2011, UNHCR Country Operations Profile: 
Colombia.  http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e492ad6.html 
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there were 10.55 million persons classified as refugees and 14.7 million persons identified as 
IDPs, totaling 25.25 million people. When adding in asylum-seekers, persons of concern, 
stateless persons, returnees (refugees and IDPs), and other people of concern to UNHCR, the 
number of persons comprising what UNHCR calls Global Forced Displacement rises to 33.9 
million persons.  
 Looking at the last ten years (2001 – 2010), the number of worldwide refugees has 
decreased slightly from 16.0 million in 2001 to 15.4 million in 2010; the number of IDPs over 
this same ten-year period exhibits an increase of 10%:  growing from 25.0 million to 27.5 
million9.  Given the events in Africa and the Middle East in 2011, it would seem highly probable 
that these numbers have risen. After examining the challenges associated with foreign aid, such 
as Easterly, Hancock, and Moyo present, one needs to examine the responsiveness of aid to the 
growth of refugees and IDPs:  Has donor-aid adjusted to reach new refugees and IDPs? Can the 
amount of assistance be easily adjusted - in tandem - with sudden rises in the number of refugees 
and IDPs? Or does an increase of refugees stay offline, not counted until some official census is 
conducted?  
 Beyond the official statistics, inspired by the research of Deepa Narayan in Voices of 
the Poor, I think of the people who comprise these numbers. I think of the masses that wait to be 
counted: what solutions are available to them today? What future solutions are available to them 
if they are not counted in an official census? Moreover, what long-term assistance is there to help 
our world’s growing refugee and IDP population? Looking at it another way, perhaps more 
philosophical and from the framework of basic human rights, I question if these people - the 33.9 
million - really count in a world filled with 7 billion people. Putting this number into a more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
:!Statistics found in UNHCR Global Trends 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html 
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local context, consider the following: would it matter if the people who currently live in New 
Hampshire, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware were suddenly uprooted and 
deposited someplace outside of the United States with just the clothes on their backs and perhaps 
a blanket or two? This combined population- approximately 33.9 million10 – had gone from their 
normal daily lives in the United States, to suddenly having nothing, including the hope of a 
future. Do these former-United States residents represent people that might have skills, abilities 
and knowledge that they could contribute to their families, to their local communities, and to an 
economic foundation of a society? Do these 33.9 million people deserve more (or less) of an 
opportunity at rebuilding their lives than the (already) counted refugees and IDPs? Or might both 
groups deserve equal opportunities in life, regardless of the journey that led them to their current 
location? 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 With this framing in mind, I turn to a question which is central to my thesis project: 
Given the trends of refugees and IDPs and the challenges associated with foreign aid, could 
microfinance assist refugees in their new locations? My hypothesis states that under the right 
framework, microfinance can be a tool that assists refugees address some of their unmet needs. 
Specifically, I approach this question through a case study of Colombian refugees living in 
Ecuador to determine if microfinance might be an effective tool to:  
1) assist refugees build or expand businesses,  
2) earn an income through microfinance-funded business activity, and  
3) address their most important needs.  
  
My hypothesis is based on the assumption that if microfinance is extended to refugees, 
then those refugees will have an opportunity to start or supplement a business, to generate 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#;!US population – 2010 State Statistics, http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf  
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income, and to be in a better position to address their most important needs.  It would seem 
logical that the refugee who borrowed from a microfinance institution, and successfully repaid 
that loan (and interest), would have also demonstrated their ability not only to repay loans, but to 
build and maintain social capital, a critical component for financial inclusion in the formal 
banking society.  Given that a lack of social capital is often held out as one of the reasons why 
microfinance cannot be extended to refugees, I decided to take a divided approach:  
1. Identify a microfinance institution either currently working with refugees, willing to work 
with refugees, or previously had worked with them, and  
 
2. Examine factors that might allow an MFI to include a refugee in their lending practice.  
 
Additional Questions: 
 As I began my research, several additional questions surfaced which helped to guide my 
research, informal interviews, data collection, and analysis.  These questions organized into three 
main subject categories: 1) refugee voice, 2) microfinance institutions’ experience with refugees, 
and 3) adaptation of social capital.  
Details on Questions: 
1. Refugee Voice: What do the refugees require: What do they view as their immediate 
needs? What assistance would they like to receive? Do they have knowledge of 
microcredit? Would they seek a micro-loan and if so, for what purpose(s)? 
2. Microfinance Institution’s Experience with Refugees:  Are there documented case studies 
(positive or negative) where microfinance has been applied to refugees in this region? If 
so, what services were provided?  What were the results of their efforts? 
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3. Adaptation of Social Capital:  Given that social capital tends to be a strong motivator in 
the extension of loans by an MFI and in the repayment of loans by the borrower, yet has 
been shown to break down in places of conflict and post-conflict, would the microfinance 
industry be open to working with this potential borrower profile? Are there steps to 
building social capital that a refugee might be taking in their new location, which might 
be assessed by an MFI in the place of traditional, more mature social capital? And if so, 
could these factors serve in lieu of social capital when evaluating a potential borrower? 
 
In summary, I hypothesize that under a specific framework, if microfinance were provided to 
refugees, it might also assist refugees in meeting their unmet needs.  With this statement, and the 
background and questions outlined above, I turn to my next section, Chapter 4, Research 
Findings and Data. 
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Chapter 4:   Research Findings and Data 
  
 While I entered my research and case study with multiple lenses and questions in order 
to better understand these very complex issues, there were three main areas in which I sought 
data: 
1. Stated needs of Colombian refugees in Ecuador, and the timeline to meet those needs, 
2. Use of microfinance in Northern Ecuador, a region where many refugees are located,  
3. Criteria for qualifying microfinance borrowers. 
Area One:  Colombian Refugees in Northern Ecuador:  Needs and Timeline 
 My findings in this area were generated by two main groups: organizations that worked 
directly with refugees and persons classified as refugees either currently or in the past. 
Discussions took place with representatives from: RefugePoint, UNHCR/ACNUR, USAID, 
Banco FINCA, and community/business leaders in Tulcán, Ecuador. 
My informal interviews and supplementary research revealed four main areas of 
information. Those areas (1-4) are listed below; details on each follow on the next page in 
Exhibit I, Colombian Refugees (in Ecuador) Needs Assessment:  
1. most common needs of these refugees,  
2. average time frame required to meet those needs, 
3. method or avenue required to address the need, and  
4. existing barriers that prevent meeting a specific need.  
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Exhibit I:    Colombian Refugees (in Ecuador) Needs Assessment 
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7-89*$0"#")-0& 3 Months – to – 
Indefinite 
• State Registration 
Offices,  
fixed and mobile 
• NGOs that assist 
with registration 
• Refugees Fear of 
Authorities 
• Location of offices not 
always clear 
• Waiting Period: can be 
lengthy (90 days-years) 
Healthcare Short- to – 
Indefinite 
• NGO clinics, 
fixed and mobile 
• Documentation 
• Packaged in some 
microfinance 
loans 
• Refugees lack knowledge 
of clinics 
• Distance/difficult to reach 
• Documentation Required 
• MFIs generally require 
borrowers to have high 
social capital, stability  
Personal Security Long – to – 
Indefinite 
• Documentation 
• Counseling 
(healthcare) 
• Microfinance 
Group Lending 
• Stability in 
community 
• Time  
• Refugee’s ability to 
cope/heal 
• Discrimination 
• Acceptance by 
community, local citizens  
Education Several months - 
to-  Indefinite 
• Documentation 
• Residency in area 
with school 
• Waiting Period (for 
documentation) 
• Costs: 
- School supplies, 
uniform 
- Time (transportation) 
- Economic (if child 
works) 
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Area Two: Microfinance in Northern Ecuador 
 Through discussions, informal interviews and participant observation with both 
employees of microfinance organizations (including USAID, UNHCR/ACNUR, the 
International Association of Microfinance Investors, Banco FINCA, Banco Pichincha, and DBS 
Bank), and the clients (microfinance borrowers) of Banco FINCA and Banco Pichincha, I 
collected data on microfinance in Northern Ecuador, an area that is heavily populated with 
Colombian refugees.  
 Geographically, Colombia shares borders with several Ecuadorian provinces: 
Sucumbíos, Esmeraldas, and Carchi (See Exhibit II, located in Appendix). Of the roughly 
175,000 persons living in the province of Sucumbíos, approximately 65% of these people are 
refugees from Colombia; of the roughly 520,000 persons living in the province Esmeraldas, 
statistically there are less than 2% categorized as refugees, though this is a significant enough 
presence for UNHCR/ACNUR to have a regional office. The province of Carchi has a 
population of 165,000 with 60% estimated to be refugees; its capital is Tulcán, a town less than 7 
kilometers from the border- this is also where I was based for my research. 
Key Findings from Participant Observation:  
1. In late 2010, UNHCR/ACNUR created a partnership with a human rights organization 21 
de Septiembre to jointly offer a microcredit pilot program in Esmeraldas. The program 
targeted 19 women who are also refugees and sex workers, and provided an average loan 
of US $300 to each woman. Thus far, with roughly one year of history, they have seen 
consistent loan repayments from the borrowers. UNHCR considers sex workers to be a 
highly vulnerable category that attracts refugees who are unable to secure other 
employment and/or are in strong need of additional income; additionally, the trafficking 
of humans (especially  for sex work) is prevalent and dangerous in the area. 
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2. Since 2000, several large (commercial) Ecuadorian banks have tested microcredit 
programs with refugees in this region: each program was declared a failure because 
borrowers failed to repay loans under the stated terms. 
3. Successful microfinance banks in the region indirectly support the refugee population. 
Because microfinance borrowers are poor, when they seek assistance in their work, they 
turn to informal laborers, a group widely comprised of refugees seeking day work (or 
longer). Additionally, many churches in Ecuador do work to support the refugees- this 
assistance is partially funded by donations by their parishioners, many of whom are 
microfinance borrowers11. 
4. Microfinance amongst the poor- non-refugees- in Ecuador is common; microfinance is a 
mature and regulated industry in Ecuador and works within the framework set by the 
Central Bank, including a maximum interest rate (cap).   
5. Most borrowers have multiple loans, repay on time, and are motivated to continue as a 
borrower in part, because of the insurance and healthcare benefits which are packaged 
into many standard microcredit loans12. 
 
Area Three:  Criteria for Qualifying Microfinance Borrowers 
 Through discussions and informal interviews with individuals who work at 
organizations in Ecuador including Banco FINCA, Banco Pichincha, and UNHCR/ACNUR, I 
compiled a list of criteria used by institutions for identifying candidates for micro-loans. I also 
attended multiple village-banking group meetings, individual loan meetings, and office meetings 
in which existing loans were updated with new interest payments and adjusted principal 
amounts, applications for new loans were reviewed, strategies for collecting on delinquent loans 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
##!Ecuador’s population is comprised of 95% Roman Catholic; there is regular attendance of mass/church service.!
http://crs.org/countries/ecuador; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html  
#$!While the State provides access to healthcare to all legal residents, there are limitations on what services are 
provided, questions surrounding payment (the State, patient, both?), issues regarding crowdedness and lengthy wait 
times at public hospitals and clinics; medical facilities are often in locations that require the poor to travel some 
distance and at a cost: these are impediments to getting prompt medical attention. 
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were determined, and other products such as insurance and savings were introduced and/or 
reviewed with borrowers. 
Key Findings from Informal Interviews with microfinance institutions in Ecuador: 
1. The approval process for group lending, such as the village-banking model, relies heavily 
on the trust and bonds between group members. In other words, the existence of positive 
social capital amongst group members is critical to approving a new group and any loans 
to a group. 
2. The approval process for both group loans and individual loans appeared to include 
personal testimonies about the borrower from nonfamily members.   
3. The borrower’s existing income and their opportunity for future income are both 
evaluated by the MFI; in many cases, the opportunity for future income seemed more 
important than the borrower’s existing earnings. 
4. With individual loans, the stated purpose of the loan was always checked by the MFI 
during the approval process. With group-lending, the stated purpose was not always 
investigated, as there seemed to be some reliance on the fact that the group serves as the 
guarantor for the loans. 
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Chapter 5:   Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations  
Discussion 
As highlighted above in Exhibit I, located in the section entitled Research Findings and Data, the 
most common needs amongst refugees in Ecuador are: documentation, healthcare, security, and 
education. Each one of these needs, in theory, can be met, or aided, by an NGO, if the refugee is 
willing to speak with an NGO representative in the region. However, in reality, most NGOs in 
this region are leanly staffed, are heavily focused on attracting donor/foreign aid, and simply do 
not have the ability (or security) to reach many of the refugees who live in the very rural and 
impoverished areas close to the border.  This interpretation of the landscape is based on my 
informal interviews and participant observations, as well as what I saw (or didn’t see) when 
visiting NGO facilities and places of work. 
 For example, it was apparent that money to run NGO operations is tight: funding is 
stretched for NGOs under normal circumstances; in the last few years, during the global crisis, 
NGOs have needed to run operations on, generally speaking, fewer dollars in response to the 
decline in donor funding.  Offices appeared understaffed, program cuts were frequent discussed, 
and there was an almost constant focus on grant-proposals and new donors. There was also an 
acknowledgement of a shortage of personnel who are able to work directly with refugees. 
Another reality, though difficult to know if it is normal or unusual, is that there also appeared to 
be an excessive amount of refugee cases waiting for attention, and most for a period of time 
exceeding several months. An employee at one organization mentioned files sitting on their desk 
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which were close to a year old yet were still in the queue for visa documentation - they described 
personnel turnover and cuts as part of the reasons for their backload.  
Documentation 
 From the refugees’ perspective, understaffing, budget cuts, and/or the lack of focus on 
their particular situation translated into “waiting in line” for attention. It also uncovered the topic 
of required documentation, visas and the various types of visa that exist; many refugees in 
Ecuador spoke of the need to obtain a migratory visa which is called Visa de Amparo which 
differs from the refugee visa. A refugee visa is short-term, relatively expensive to renew on an 
annual basis, and does not provide access to benefits such as healthcare. The Visa de Amparo is 
longer term and supposedly facilitates better employment and housing; with a refugee visa, the 
consensus was that refugees can only live and work informally, generally on the edge of 
legality13. However, refugees and NGOs expressed frustration with the visa processing system 
that is currently in place in Ecuador, indicating that it seemed like a lottery with “few winnings”: 
very few Visas de Amparo are granted each year, with a very small percentage of those are 
allocated to refugees. 
Healthcare 
 In most discussions, access to healthcare was mentioned as a vital need. While several 
people and agencies indicated NGOs including UNHCR/ACNUR, that provide healthcare in 
towns along the border, most suggested that the majority of organizations were only helpful if 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 There is a significant difference in the cost of living in Ecuador versus Colombia: Ecuador is significantly less 
expensive than Colombia (gasoline in Ecuador costs $2/gallon, and $16/gallon in Colombia). Smuggling of 
foodstuffs, gasoline, clothing, appliances, equipment and machinery is a widely-spread along the border towns. 
Source:  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Enhanced refugee registration and human security in northern 
Ecuador, January 2011, ISSN 1020-7473, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d887ad62.html [accessed 3 November 2011] 
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the need for medical attention was not urgent or unusual. Refugees complained that even with a 
refugee identification card (from their refugee visa), they had limited- if any- access to Ecuador’s 
State healthcare system. They indicated that the “best” healthcare was provided by the State but 
that it is only accessible for residents and persons who held a Visa de Amparo.  Given the 
difficulties in obtaining that Visa, refugees know they need to explore other types of healthcare.  
 An example of nonState-sponsored healthcare was the partnerships details by 
UNHCR/ACNUR. They have developed partnerships with local clinics in order to increase the 
number of available healthcare facilities for refugees, subsidize the costs, and shorten the 
required travel distance to the clinic.  A different approach is the one taken by USAID who also 
spoke of partnerships with local services and healthcare providers, but emphasized their efforts 
on infrastructure projects such as the building of a municipality’s public waterworks, in order to 
provide clean water to a town, such as in the Esmeraldas in Northern Ecuador. They commented 
specifically on the impact that these projects have on children under the age of 5, who now, with 
access to clean water, suffer illnesses less frequently and as a group, have a substantially higher 
life expectancy than previous “under age 5 children” who did not have access to clean water.  
While such statistics are impressive, it is questionable whether this partnership example is 
sustainable: if foreign donors change their geographic focus in the future, how would additional 
projects get funded and completed? How would other towns gain access to clean water and 
improve their children’s life expectancy? The answer is not clear to me.  
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Security 
 The reason that most refugees fled their homes in Colombia is tied to the Colombian 
conflict and related violence. Clearly, the need for security was not met where they lived, nor 
was there a government in place that could offer them personal security. While security is often 
used in a broad sense, it can be better defined by the type of security that is in jeopardy: political, 
personal, health, economic, community, environmental, and food (McGrath 2011, Verney 2009). 
Situated in Ecuador, most refugees spoke of their continued need for economic security and 
personal safety; NGOs discussed their challenge of physically reaching many refugees who lived 
in the more remote areas along the border (estimated to be half the refugee population in 
Ecuador) due to the threats of guerrilla activity and therefore, the concern focused on personal 
security: could they safely travel to and from those areas? Between Colombian guerrilla groups, 
such as the FARC, that have encroached upon the border territory, and other organized gangs 
who traffic drugs and human beings across the border, personal security issues are a large and 
growing concern, making it even more difficult for assistance to be administered in this region 
(Korovkin 2008). 
 While roughly half of Colombian refugees in Ecuador live in these rural areas, others 
live in more urban locations also inside the northern provinces. In these areas, refugees indicated 
a strong concern for personal security, citing stories of brutalities, harassment, and 
discrimination because of their refugee status, race (many are indigenous or Afro-Colombian), or 
sex; many cited stories of Ecuadorian police and military abuses.  As a result, the fear has 
become detrimental to the refugee: UNHCR/ACNUR shared that domestic violence and abuse in 
refugee communities are substantially higher than average but tend to go unreported because of 
the refugee’s fear of the police. NGOs assert that abuses generally will not be reported by the 
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victim in cases where the refugee or related family member is undocumented or has a pending 
visa (Verney 2009).  
 While several NGOs attempt to educate refugees about their basic human rights, their 
rights as refugees, and where applicable, their rights as indigenous persons, there seemed to be 
an acknowledgement that they can’t reach everyone with that information, and that even those 
who better understand their rights still have a fear of the authorities. Given many refugees’ 
experiences in Colombia where it was difficult to trust local authorities or neighbors14, coupled 
with the alleged abuses by some police and military officials in Ecuador, the fear of authorities is 
very common and deeply rooted, and not one that appears likely to go away over a short period 
of time. That said, there was a common perception that obtainment of the coveted Visa de 
Amparo would offer a refugee more rights and therefore, help the refugee be more like a citizen 
of Ecuador, which, in turn, would include the right to legal protection and security.  Given that 
very few refugees are granted a Visa de Amparo, this option, in reality, does not seem very 
promising or capable of addressing their deep need for security and safety.  
 While not a concept widely adopted, the idea of microfinance lending groups does offer 
the prospect of building security: because each person in the group serves as the guarantor for 
another person in the group, a strong sense of solidarity is developed; new members are accepted 
(or denied) by the group, not the bank loan officer. As such, the group is formed around each 
member and in support of each member, and in doing so, would seem to address some of the 
concerns about security, although not all. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#<!Between multiple guerrilla organizations, paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and supporters of one these groups, it 
is difficult for Colombians living in conflict-regions to trust anyone at face-value: allegiances are often disguised 
For persons living under these circumstances, safety means not trusting anyone outside of one’s immediate family. 
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Education 
 Looking at another need, I turn to education. NGOs I met with reported access to 
education as one of the most crucial areas of their work, not only because of the need to educate 
children but because of the significance that it carries: if a child stays in school through grade 5, 
there is a higher probability that the child will continue attending school. They noted that often 
parents are forced to take their children out of school in order to have them help with their work 
or with the childcare of younger siblings while the parent is at work.  
 Registered refugees shared the need to sometimes “borrow” the child from school but 
their intention was to minimize the length of disruption and only when the parent had an 
emergency and no other option. Speaking with these parents, there was steadfast agreement that 
they wanted their children in school and later, attending university; parents were very vocal 
about the need to educate their children so that did not have to live the life that they (the parent) 
had. They spoke passionately about education being a main reason they came to Ecuador and the 
motivation for settling in a particular municipality15.  
 Findings in this category clearly demonstrated that access to education is hinged on 
registration: without registering as a refugee or asylum-seeker, children are not permitted in 
schools. While there are strong efforts to integrate children in schools, as well as to provide some 
educational programs, NGOs and UNHCR/ACNUR speak openly about registration serving as 
the gateway for education, healthcare, and an improved living situation. While refugees agreed 
with these statements, they also acknowledged that having children attend school opened up 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#6!Education in Ecuador is free to refugees once they are registered. Because secondary schools are scarce in remote 
villages, especially along the border, larger towns and municipalities are more attractive for settlement. 
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other issues such as discrimination and the increased financial burden of additional expenses (for 
transportation and school supplies); they said that these issues, while challenging, were 
preferable to not having access to education but that the situation was more complicated than 
they had expected. 
The Bridging of Stated Needs 
 Listening to these issues and needs, as well as the refugees’ lament about “better” 
problems, as described in the previous paragraph, it appears very clear that the basic needs of 
documentation, healthcare, security, and education stand little chance of being met by any one 
solution including NGO aid, NGO assistance, and State services.  Thus, with little prospect for 
meaningful assistance, we see most refugees taking on almost any form of work in order to 
receive an income and attempt to meet those needs.  An example of the extent to which some 
refugees will go is sex work/prostitution, a group which UNHCR/ACNUR views as one of the 
most vulnerable.  
 In an attempt to offer assistance to this group during the current environment of limited 
resources, the UNHCR/ACNUR office located in Esmeraldas, Ecuador partnered with 21 de 
Septiembre, a human rights organization that educates sex workers about their legal rights. 
Together, they structured and implemented a pilot microcredit program for 19 female refugee sex 
workers. The 19 women were selected by 21 de Septiembre based on the following criteria:  
 1) previous interaction between 21 de Septiembre and the borrower,  
 2) a potential to earn income from employment outside of sex work, and  
 3) potential for skills training for employment outside of sex work.   
 
The program disbursed an average loan per borrower of US $300.  The purpose of each loan was 
typically for the purchase of supplies for the borrower’s other job such as clothing for a retail 
  
54 
!
shop or hair products for a beauty parlor; several loans were also use for a major household 
expense and for an education. 
 Results through April 2011 show no defaults from the borrowers, but almost more 
importantly, the partnership exemplifies a path that NGOs can take to provide assistance even 
with their own constraints such as lack of staff or funding.  Given refugees’ needs, and the 
challenge that NGOs have in the long-term provision of aid, microfinance seems to emerge as 
something that might be worthy of consideration. Microfinance also appeals to those refugees 
who seek more independence and have a desire to invest in their employment. When factoring in 
the insurance and healthcare that are packaged with standard microcredit loans through regulated 
microfinance banks in Ecuador like Banco FINCA, there is even more incentive for a refugee to 
obtain a microcredit loan: such a loan would not only provide financial assistance in their work 
and therefore, hopefully, facilitate more income, but it would address their need for healthcare 
given the embedded services that loan contains. What’s not to like about that? 
 In reality, the challenge with this concept is that very few organizations and banks will 
loan to refugees. Large commercial banks in Ecuador state that they attempted several test 
programs over the last decade and they all failed. Microfinance banks like Banco FINCA do not 
have the skills, resources, or appetite to set up refugee programs; microfinance for refugees 
would require additional training and education, as well as more frequent loan meetings between 
the borrower and loan officer, a pattern that microfinance banks like Banco FINCA are trying to 
reduce, not expand, due to the costs involved with each meeting. Additionally, given that half the 
refugees live in the very rural areas, outreach to these people would be difficult as well as 
expensive. The pilot program mentioned above, administered by UNHCR/ACNUR, takes place 
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in a more urban location in Esmeraldas- an area that not only is easy to access but cost effective 
for the organizations, as they have other meetings in the same towns. So, could there be a 
solution of potentially offering microfinance to more refugees in urban (less rural) locations 
where the microfinance banks already have operations? 
 Unfortunately, there are still challenges with that suggestion, as MFIs have set criteria 
for qualifying borrowers. This criterion includes evaluating the person’s current employment, 
obtaining their credit rating (if available), verifying their place of residence, and validating a 
minimum level of documentation for country residency.   Additionally, microfinance in Ecuador 
is regulated and part of the banking industry and therefore subject to standard banking protocol. 
This creates a bias towards setting policies that exist in commercial banks- in the banks that 
won’t include the poor, let alone consider refugees. As a result, the process for qualifying 
borrowers is based on standard commercial bank loan policy. Thus, the process to obtain an 
individual loan at microfinance institutions closely mirrors a larger, commercial bank and 
therefore seems less viable for a refugee.  
 However, as noted in several village-banking meetings, there is some consideration 
given to personal relationships and the guarantor-structure which serves as a guarantee in the 
event of a borrower default (the group would absorb that loan, and be responsible for its 
repayment).  Through group meetings, bonds and security build amongst group members; 
through the loan, comes the provision of healthcare services (attached to standard loans). Thus, it 
would appear that if a refugee would be admitted to a village-banking group, they would be able 
to address their need for security and healthcare, not to mention have the opportunity to invest in 
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their work (and future income). I would assume that once a refugee is documented, has some 
stability and security, they would soon enroll their children in school. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 Unfortunately, the scenario mentioned above is dependent on registration and 
documentation. Despite the refugee visa being short-term, expensive, and time-consuming, it 
appears to be the easiest way for a refugee to become registered. It might not address all of the 
refugee’s needs in their new county, but it does provide them with some form of documentation 
and status. With this in hand, refugees are at least accounted for and can be legally hired for 
work, albeit not all employers will hire refugees even with visas. Despite that, it is evident that a 
refugee with some documentation (including the refugee visa) who lives in an urban region will 
have more opportunity. From this point, if the refugee could get accepted into a microfinance 
village-banking group, their four stated needs would be directly met or improved (with the 
assumption that their children would be admitted to school soon after receiving their registration 
documents).  
 What this scenario requires is a microfinance institution that is willing to look beyond 
the standard definition of social capital, and consider the steps that the refugee has taken to get to 
where they are. What needs to be considered is the work ethic of these refugees, who are willing 
to take almost any type of work in order to earn income and provide for their families.  This ethic 
appears to be a critical driver in motivating the refugee and in assessing their determination to 
secure future income; this ethic can only be understood by direct interaction with the refugee; it 
is generally the unifying trait in the testimonies offered to describe a person’s appropriateness for 
a village-banking group. In short, my scenario would depend on a microfinance institution 
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developing relationships with the refugee community and identifying those refugees with this 
type of work ethic; it would depend on a commitment to engagement, resources, time, and 
patience. 
 Are microfinance institutions in Ecuador able to make this commitment, or are they 
capable of developing experimental pilot programs, like the one created by UNCHR/ACNUR in 
Esmeraldas? Or does the fact that microfinance is a mature industry (in Ecuador and Latin 
America) stand in the way of its own evolution: is it too large a system, too deeply rooted, and so 
well-defined that it cannot progress or be expanded? Or, sadly, does the reality of one third of all 
people in Ecuador living in poverty, not including Colombian refugees, serve as the real barrier, 
i.e., microfinance institutions need not go far to find potential borrowers so why should they 
bother with all the issues tied to refugees?16 Might it be a combination of all of these questions, 
when one steps back to consider each issue and their implications? 
 So what does all of this mean? First, I would suggest that there is a need for 
microfinance institutions in Ecuador to affirm their social mission of providing financial services 
to the poor, whomever and wherever they might be; I suggest that the poor be inclusive of 
refugees.  Second, it would be beneficial for microfinance institutions to form working-
partnerships with NGOs and other organizations that might supplement the required time and 
resources required to develop relationships with refugees; this supplemental information could 
contribute to the MFI’s assessment of the refugee-borrower and the borrower’s potential for 
future income. While not a perfect substitute for traditional social capital, this information could 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#7!Approximately one third of the population in Ecuador lives below the poverty line. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ec.html  
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contribute a perspective that currently is lacking, and conceivably, be positioned as interim social 
capital, while the refugee becomes integrated in their new society.  
 Lastly, I assert that social capital is identified through observation and relationships, not 
from a checklist or definition found in textbook. Throughout my research, I encountered many 
organizations pursuing initiatives because the money had been provided for that specific project; 
I also found a level of competition amongst organizations, hearing them focus on becoming more 
profitable, the need to grow certain business areas, and the need to improve procedures that 
would increase employees’ efficiency. Yet, I also heard numerous employees who worked at 
these organizations speak passionately about their efforts, about the people they serve, and about 
the progress of their clients, the borrowers; I saw and heard the pride that these employees had in 
their clients. In village-banking meetings and in individual lending meetings, I heard endless 
stories about how grateful the borrower was to have received their first loan from Banco FINCA: 
how no other bank would give them a loan at that time, how Banco FINCA gave them a loan 
because they had taken the time to get to know them and their plan for that loan, and how, 
ultimately, Banco FINCA knew their work ethic. Many of these people had been borrowing from 
Banco FINCA for years, despite developing relationships with other banks. However, they 
continued to borrow from Banco FINCA because of their loyalty tied to that very first loan, for 
being given a chance. I also heard these people talk about their banking officer as though they 
were a close member of their family; I even heard a few borrowers say that they took out their 
last loan with Banco FINCA because they would have felt bad not to renew the loan with their 
officer. It became evident that loyalty is also tied to social capital: that a personal attestation 
about someone’s credibility builds loyalty which becomes a factor- maybe the glue - in social 
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capital, and this carries meaning. In other words, the development of personal relationships 
identifies and maintains social capital.  
 As trends in the world point to increasingly more disturbances, conflicts, and 
displacements, it would seem likely that the population of refugees across the globe will continue 
to rise.  Based on questions that surround foreign aid, including its effectiveness, it appears 
unlikely that sufficient aid will ever reach those in need, including refugees.  
To me, a world without poverty means a world in which every person can take care of 
his or her basic life needs. In such a world, nobody would die from hunger or suffer 
from malnutrition. This is a goal world leaders have been calling for for decades, but 
they have never set out any way of achieving it. (Yunus, 1999: 261) 
 
While not a panacea for all, microfinance represents a bridge to economic independence and 
improved livelihoods.  In short, if microfinance institutions developed partnerships with local 
NGOs which complemented their skills and knowledge and thus, reduced their individual 
weaknesses, increasingly more impoverished people, including refugees, could be reached. 
While the first year of any new program is often too early to foretell success, initial feedback on 
the partnership of UNHCR/ACNUR and 21 de Septiembre suggests an optimistic projection.  
Drawing upon what might be a successful endeavor, what if more NGOs stepped forward and 
created similar partnerships, offering refugees assistance such as microfinance?  Additionally, 
given existing relationships between some NGOs and refugees, why wouldn’t more microfinance 
institutions develop partnerships with such NGOs and thus, continue their mission of providing 
financial services to the poor while reducing the risks traditionally associated with refugees?  
Together, these partnerships might offer a more holistic and sustainable way to meet the ongoing 
challenges of our world.  While more research is required to uncover the most effective ways of 
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structuring such partnerships, it would appear that the only thing that might be lost through the 
pursuit of such a model is the excuse of not moving ahead, not challenging ourselves as an 
industry, as a society, to further the shared mission of reaching the poor, all poor, whomever and 
wherever they reside. 
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 Appendix:  
Map of Ecuador 
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